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The Indian nuclear tests of May u and
13, 1998, shook an unsuspecting world.
Long at the forefront of the movement
for universal nuclear disarmament, India
had continually chastised the five declared
nuclear powers (the United States, Russia,
China, France, and the United Kingdom)
for not moving to eliminate their nuclear
arsenals as called for by the 197o nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. After demon-
strating its own nuclear capacity in 1974,
India had refrained from testing for more
than two decades. And apparently, neither
the emergence of a government in New
Delhi led by the right-of-center Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) nor the Indian elites'
deep reservations about the global non-
proliferation regime had disturbed this
quiescence. Indian decision-makers had
indicated that they would not carry out
nuclear tests until they had completed a
lengthy "strategic review' of security
threats and how best to cope with them.
The explosions in the Rajasthan desert,
therefore-in addition to prompting
Pakistan to detonate a few of its own
nuclear bombs two weeks later--set off
corresponding explosions in capitals
around the world. Foreign diplomats,
academics, pundits, and policymakers
quickly and sharply criticized India for
bucking the trend toward nuclear re-
straint. The open declarations of India
and Pakistan as nuclear weapons powers,
many asserted, would unravel the carefully
woven fabric of the nonproliferation
regime by encouraging other states to
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acquire nuclear weapons. They might even
propel the subcontinent toward nuclear war.
The condemnations belittled New
Delhi's stated reason for testing-namely,
a growing threat from its powerful
neighbor, China. China had not made
any overt threats across the border, so
what could be the problem? Foreigners
instead generally ascribed the tests to
what they saw as petty motivations: a
desire to elevate India's international
status and an attempt to bolster the
BJP-led government's fortunes.
Three years on, however, little evidence
has emerged to support these proffered
motives. The quest for global status has
been a staple of Indian foreign policy since
the country's emergence as an independent
state in 1947, and India's basic nuclear
capability dates back more than 20 years;
it is hard to link these essentially constant
factors to a significant policy shift. As
for the notion that the tests were designed
to boost a sagging government's fortunes,
informed analysts of Indian politics know
that the fate of a governing coalition in
New Delhi depends much more on the
allocation of scarce resources such as
ministerial positions than on arcane
matters of national security and strategy.
Even some ardent critics of the Indian
nuclear weapons program now concede
as much. In his new book India: Emerging
Power, the noted South Asian security
analyst Stephen P. Cohen echoes many
commentators in attributing the tests to
a blend of status-seeking and domestic
politics, but he also acknowledges that
these factors alone were not sufficient to
drive India to explode five nuclear bombs.
It now appears that the real reason for
the tests was indeed fear of the long-term
security threat posed by China and
Pakistan, coupled with bureaucratic
pressures emanating from within India's
scientific-technological complex. Yet
only a handful of Western analysts have
recognized these motivations, and even
fewer have been willing to concede the
legitimacy of India's strategic concerns.
In fact, until recently no systematic book-
length treatment of the subject was
available. Now Ashley Tellis' India's
Emerging Nuclear Posture-carefully
researched, meticulously documented,
and tightly argued-ably fills this void.
It is not merely a tour d'horizon of the
likely future of the Indian nuclear weapons
program, but a tour deforce on the subject
of nuclear proliferation in general.
DETERRENCE "LITE"
Tellis has paid excruciating attention to
detail, scouring both regional and inter-
national sources from journalism to the
policy world to academia. Relying on a
massive collection of evidence, he shows
how growing perceptions of a security
threat from China and Pakistan led Indian
decision-makers toward overt weaponiza-
tion and the abandonment of the country's
long-held posture of nuclear ambiguity.
He documents how China's security
assistance to Pakistan during the 199os,
especially in the realms of nuclear weapons
design and ballistic missile technology,
made Pakistan a virtual strategic surrogate
for China in South Asia--and how India's
security establishment took note of and
sought to counter this emerging threat.
Although Tellis emphasizes the critical
role of external threats in precipitating
the full development of India's nuclear
and missile programs, he also provides a
nuanced discussion of the influence of
key bureaucratic constituencies. He shows
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how India's atomic energy establishment,
Defense Research and Development
Organization, and space research program
boosted and sustained both the nuclear
and missile enterprises. But Tellis also
delves within these institutions, demon-
strating how a complex interaction among
elected representatives, civilian strategists,
key military officers, and the leaders of
India's strategic technological enclaves
drove the decision-making process.
The most important proposition that
emerges from Tellis' analysis is the primacy
of the political, understood broadly
rather than narrowly. Key decisions resulted
not from bureaucratic turf battles or com-
plex institutions but from the preferences
and choices of India's elected elites acting
in concert with critical members of
various military and technological entities.
The Indian political process Tellis
describes is inherently cautious, reactive,
and acutely sensitive to fiscal constraints.
An important consequence of these
structural tendencies, Tellis argues, is
that Indian decision-makers are likely to
opt for a nuclear weapons program that
is strictly limited in scope-in terms of
the numbers of its warheads and delivery
vehicles as well as operational readiness-
despite considerable pressure from civilian
strategic commentators. The emerging
Indian arsenal is composed of weapons
and delivery systems
with key subcomponents maintained
under civilian custody, but [with] those
assets as a whole ... not deployed in any
way that enables the prompt conduct of
nuclear operations. Such assets are, in fact,
sequestered and covertly maintained in
distributed form, with different custodians
exercising strict stewardship over the com-
ponents entrusted to them for safekeeping.
This "force in being," Tellis argues
persuasively, comports well with the
stated goals of India's draft nuclear doc-
trine and the country's perceived strategic
needs. It eschews both "recessed deterrence"
(a term coined by the Indian strategist
Jasjit Singh to describe an arsenal stored
in such a way as to require lengthy prepa-
ration to assemble and launch warheads),
which was deemed inadequate for India's
strategic requirements, and the pursuit of
a "ready arsenal" (one with nuclear missiles
that can be launched at a moment's notice),
which would require a costly investment
that could provoke adverse Pakistani and
possibly even Chinese responses.
The emergent Indian nuclear doctrine,
according to Tellis, emphasizes the political
as opposed to the military utility of nuclear
weapons. This assertion may appear banal,
but the distinction is not trivial: both
the doctrine and subsequent Indian
statements have explicitly underscored
that Indian decision-makers view the
arsenal as a pure deterrent rather than as
an instrument of war. In effect, then, the
principal role of India's nuclear force is
to protect the nation from the prospect
of nuclear blackmail and coercion at the
hands of China or Pakistan, and the
country's policymakers appear confident
that a small nuclear force capable of sur-
viving a first strike will do the job.
The deterrent nature of India's nuclear
doctrine is reflected at the operational
level of policymaking, about which Tellis
provides a scrupulous discussion based
on what can be gleaned from open
sources. India has unequivocally renounced
the first use of nuclear weapons. Though
it is tempting to dismiss this commitment
as mere boilerplate, there is strong reason
to believe that it is actually sincere. It is
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rally on the first anniversary oflndia's nuclear test, Mumbai, May ii, 999
consistent with New Delhi's declared
nuclear doctrine, it permits India to
announce its basically pacific intentions
toward its adversaries, and it conforms
to the expectations of a "force-in-being"
that cannot provide rapid recourse during
a crisis. The commitment to deterrence
through the threat of punishment empha-
sizes India's lack of interest in using nuclear
weapons to pursue either territorial or
political expansion and its intention to
use them instead simply to give pause to
any would-be attacker or blackmailer.
As for targeting strategy, finally, it
appears that India is developing a modified
countervalue approach-putting an adver-
sary's civilian assets at risk. This strategy
involves making a virtue out of necessity,
because a counterforce capability (i.e., one
that targets an opponent's military forces)
will be both technologically and fiscally
beyond India's grasp for the foreseeable
future. Tellis aptly sums up India's strategy,
therefore, as a "lite" version of the Cold War
doctrine of mutual assured destruction.
NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITY
If Tellis is correct, many of the oft-expressed
fears about nuclear instability in South
Asia will prove to be unfounded. A small,
secure, dispersed, and highly concealed
Indian nuclear force, for example, would
be invulnerable to a bolt-from-the-blue
strike by Pakistan. And the problems of
command and control that plague larger,
more complex nuclear forces are unlikely
to haunt India's decision-makers for quite
some time. The likelihood of a regional
nuclear confrontation with Pakistan
should thus remain quite small.
Nevertheless, India's overt weaponiza-
tion and Pakistan's response have created
a different set of dangers: the region is
now subject to what the American strategic
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analyst Glenn Snyder called the "stability-
instability paradox." Given the extraordi-
nary destructiveness of nuclear weapons
and the horrific consequences that would
follow from their use on the subcontinent,
neither side is likely to view them as
effective instruments of war. Under the
seemingly reassuring shadow of the
nuclear umbrella, however, both sides
may be tempted to make limited or
temporary incursions in strategically
peripheral areas. Indeed, the world
witnessed the first such move in the
summer of 1999, when Pakistani army
troops crossed the Line of Control (the
working boundary) in Kashmir and held
onto territory in the frozen redoubts of
Kargil for more than a month.
It is worth noting, however, that during
the ensuing conflict, India showed military
restraint and a scrupulous desire to keep
the fighting localized, in marked contrast
to its behavior in the pre-nuclear era.
When Pakistan attacked Indian positions
in Kashmir in 1965, for example, within
one week Indian forces had counterattacked
in Punjab, thereby dramatically expanding
the scope and dimensions of the conflict.
In 1999, by contrast, India delayed using
airpower in Kargil and avoided opening
up another front elsewhere along the
international border, although doing so
could have strained Islamabad's limited
resources. Care must of course be exercised
in drawing generalizations about regional
stability from one state's behavior in a
single crisis. Nevertheless, India's restraint
in Kargil may indicate that the implications
of its nuclear status have not been entirely
lost on its decision-makers.
A limited Indian nuclear force is also
unlikely to set off panic in China. The
vastly larger size and greater capabilities
of China's ballistic missile arsenal provide
it with a considerable degree of security
against India; India may well be able to
assuage its own fears of Chinese nuclear
blackmail without generating commen-
surate fears in China. Indeed, recent
developments in Sino-Indian relations
suggest that both sides have managed
to set aside the acrimony that initially
followed the Indian tests. In late June
2001 the Sino-Indian Experts' Group, a
joint negotiating body, finally exchanged
maps of the middle sector along the
Himalayan border disputed by Beijing
and New Delhi. Though progress on
the border question is, like the border
itself, glacial, both sides clearly have a
renewed interest in avoiding conflict
and steadily reducing tensions, and it is
possible that the possession of explicit
nuclear capabilities may have made India
feel secure enough to take a more moderate
negotiating stance.
SECURITY COMPLEX
The policy prescriptions Tellis offers run
counter to much of the prevailing wisdom
about nonproliferation. He argues force-
fully that the United States should pursue
a differentiated rather than a universal
nonproliferation policy, one that explicitly
takes into account the particular security
concerns of India and Pakistan (as well as
Israel). In making this argument Tellis
debunks the all-too-familiar contention
that the pursuit of such a differentiated
policy would inevitably create a "demon-
stration effect" whereby the example of
U.S. leniency would embolden other
potential proliferators. As he writes, "while
international anarchy may be seamless in
theory, in practice it is usually contained
within specific 'security complexes.' This
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implies that actions initiated by a particular
state usually evoke counteractions only
by those states directly threatened by
these actions and not others." Even if
there is an action-reaction cycle, therefore,
it is likely to remain confined to particular
geographic areas of historical animosity
between states. India developed nuclear
weapons to counter security threats from
China and, secondarily, Pakistan. Pakistan,
in turn, acquired its nuclear arsenal to cope
with India's overwhelming conventional
superiority. In other words, whatever the
other Asian states do, they will do it for
their own reasons, and not because they
are simply emulating what their South
Asian siblings have done.
Tellis also challenges the notion that
U.S. acceptance of the nuclearization of
India and Pakistan will inevitably shred
the carefully woven fabric of the global
nonproliferation regime. He contends
that such an outcome is highly improbable
so long as the United States and the
other nuclear powers continue to enforce
existing nonproliferation norms, not least
because India's past behavior filly supports
the principles of nonproliferation: it
rebuffed Iran's mid-198os attempts to
purchase sensitive nuclear technologies
and has a solid domestic framework of
export controls.
What do the peculiar dynamics of
regional security complexes that Tellis
describes imply about the wisdom of
Washington's current, seemingly unyielding
stance on global nonproliferation versus
a more differentiated policy? And what
should U.S. policymakers do about the
South Asian nuclear situation in particular,
as both India and Pakistan remain under
the sanctions imposed after their tests?
How one answers these questions will
depend largely on the assumptions one
holds about the consequences of nuclear
proliferation. Thus far, U.S. policy has
been based on the premise that nuclear
proliferation is necessarily inimical to
U.S. interests. What Tellis' book helps
to make clear is that even if such a policy
was appropriate to the strategic needs of
the Cold War, today it is anachronistic
and unsustainable. The nuclear arsenals of
India and Pakistan do not fundamentally
threaten U.S. security interests, nor are
they likely to.
Without much fanfare or the explicit
abandonment of the goal of containing
the spread of weapons of mass destruction,
therefore, the United States should adopt
a more nuanced nonproliferation agenda--
one that distinguishes between proliferators
that threaten U.S. interests and commit-
ments and those states that seek nuclear
weapons largely to assuage their own
regional strategic insecurities. Sanctions
originally devised as a tool to coerce India
and Pakistan on nuclear issues have out-
lived whatever usefulness they might
once have had. Perversely, they have not
only alienated significant sections of the
Indian strategic affairs community from
the United States but also contributed to
India's increased self-reliance in critical
military technologies. In Pakistan, mean-
while, the sanctions have led to feelings
of abandonment and an erosion of
American influence.
A properly calibrated U.S. policy
toward South Asia would continue to
promote Indo-Pakistani dialogue on
Kashmir and encourage the pursuit of
confidence-building and arms-control
measures. It would also acknowledge
India's genuine misgivings about China's
capabilities and behavior in the region.
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But it would abandon the Canute-like .
goal of rolling back South Asian nuclear
programs and focus on stabilizing them United States
instead. To this end, it would dwell less
on overt Indian and Pakistani adherence Instituteof Peace
to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
than on the seepage of critical technologies Spring 2002 Solicited
from South Asia to other volatile regions. n
Such a policy would hardly win universal o
acclaim, not least because it would go
against the grain of so much received
wisdom in the arms control and non- The United States Institute of Peace is
proliferation community. But it would accepting applications for its SpringSolicited Grant Competition.
have two important advantages over 
the
current stance: it would be correctly Each year the Institute offers financial
support for research, education, train-
perceived as far less hypocritical, and ing, and the dissemination of information
it would hold far greater promise of in the fields of international peace and
achieving important results.0 conflict management.
Topics for the Spring 2002
Solicited Grant Competition:
" Strategic Nonviolence
" The Middle East
* Training
The Institute encourages applications
from nonprofit organizations and official
public institutions. Individuals may also
apply.
For further information and application mate-
rials, please call, write, or e-mail:
Solicited Grants
United States Institute of Peace
1200 17th Street NW - Suite 200
Washington, DC 20036-3011
(202) 429-3842 * Fax (202) 833-1018
TTY (202) 457-1719
e-mail: grant-program@usip.org
Starting October 30th, application materials
may be downloaded from our website:
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The deadline for receipt of Spring 2002
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Award announcements will be made in late
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